

FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR

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Warning of Increasing Robbery Risks to ATM Technicians

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The FBI's Criminal Investigative Division, in coordination with the Office of Private Sector (OPS), prepared this Liaison Information Report (LIR) to warn companies in the financial services sector about new ATM robbery tactics and the increased safety risks to ATM technicians. Due to improved ATM security, technology, and placement, some criminals may be shifting to new ATM robbery tactics, whereby the technician inadvertently does the most difficult part of the theft: opening the machine.

Since 2021, ATM technician attacks have more than doubled. In some cases, criminals sabotage the ATMs and wait for service technicians to arrive. As the technicians open the ATM, the criminals threaten or assault the technician and subsequently steal the ATM cash cassettes. Additionally, criminals are reportedly following ATM technicians from their homes or between jobs and robbing them at non-sabotaged machines. These new techniques have had a high success rate, with some incidents resulting in the theft of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The following activities are potential indicators of imminent criminal activity. A single indicator does not accurately predict ATM technician assault or ATM theft; financial organizations should consider the totality of facts and circumstances before reporting to security/law enforcement personnel.

- Repeated sightings of the same vehicle following technicians from job to job or from home to job;
- Occupied vehicles not parked in marked parking spaces idling near ATMs, particularly vehicles idling for an extended period; and
- Obvious signs of ATM sabotage (for example, sticky substances blocking card slots, cards glued into slots, damage to keypads or screens, damaged or jammed cash dispensers).

Companies in the financial services sector should consider training ATM technicians, including those accompanied by private security guards, on some of the following mitigation techniques:

- Upon observing unusual activity potentially indicative of criminal activity at an ATM, technicians should:
 - o Immediately suspend the service call;
 - Do not open the ATM;



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- Enter the branch to alert the bank manager on duty, or enter the closest occupied building if servicing a standalone machine;
- Contact local law enforcement, alert them to the possibility of a robbery, and request officer assistance;
- o Wait in a safe location for the police officer to arrive, then repair the ATM; and
- o Hand over all evidence to the responding police officer.
- If ATM technicians notice they are being followed in transit to or from an ATM service location, they should contact emergency services and head toward the nearest police or fire station.

This LIR may be read in conjunction with LIR 240925002A, "Robbery Crews Use Multiple Techniques to Target ATM Service Technicians in Virginia," dated 25 September 2024; LIR 231229010, "Robbery Crews Assault ATM Repair Technicians to Maximize Profit," dated 29 December 2023; LIR 231204010, "Traveling ATM Robbery Crews Shift Tradecraft to Include Surveilling Robbery Targets," dated 4 December 2023; and LIR 220502002, "Threat Actors Targeting Automated Teller Machine Technicians in the United States," dated 2 May 2022.

The FBI's Office of Private Sector disseminated this LIR; please direct any requests and questions to your FBI Private Sector Coordinator at your local FBI Field Office: https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices.



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